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ARGUMENT 
I. THERE EXIST SIGNIFICANT ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT WHICH REQUIRE A HEARING ON THE MERITS. 
The plaintiff contends that summary judgment was justified 
since the defendant offered no evidence contradicting the terms of 
the stipulation, or clarifying the decedent's intent in relation to 
the contract; however, plaintiff failed to provide the court with 
any legally sufficient evidence or affidavits to justify her 
motion. 
The decree of divorce did not refer to the life insurance 
since the suspect provision contained in the stipulation was left 
out of the decree. Furthermore, the language in the stipulation is 
vague and clearly subject to interpretation. The provision 
required each party to "continue in force and effect any life 
insurance policies that each party currently has for the benefit of 
the minor child of the parties." Nowhere in the stipulation or the 
decree is the term "beneficiary" used. There exists a factual 
basis to conclude that the decedent understood and intended the 
provision to require an assurance that the child would receive 
child support in case of his death. Further, it is reasonable to 
assume, that in light of that understanding, an actual 
"beneficiary" status would be unnecessary. 
The trial court erred in granting the motion for summary 
judgment in light of the ambiguities. Utah follows the general 
rule that "only when contract terms are complete, clear and 
unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a motion for 
summary judgment." Colonial Leasing, 731 P.2d, 488 (1983). A 
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contract is ambiguous "if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of "uncertain meanings of terms, missing 
terms or other facial deficiencies." Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 
P.2d 104, 108 (1991) (quoting from Faulkner v. Farnsworth 665 P.2d 
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983) . 
Furthermore, and contrary to the reasoning of the plaintiff, 
the moving party has the burden to prove that there exists no issue 
as to any material fact. In the case of Fox v. Allstate Insurance 
Company 453 P.2d 701 (Utah 1969), plaintiff brought suit seeking 
reimbursement from his insurance company for the loss of his boat, 
which he alleged struck a submerged item in Utah Lake and sunk. 
Plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment and filed an 
affidavit which in essence reiterated his complaint. The 
defendant's insurance company relied on circumstantial evidence and 
could not produce direct evidence contrary to plaintiff's 
allegations. The motion was granted. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court and remanded for a trial on the merits. 
The court, in supporting its reasoning provided the following 
analogy: 
. . . anyone could allege that he ate a mouse which was 
in a can of pork and beans, and while he might or might 
not be able to recover on the trial of the action against 
the canner and distributor of the food, he could win on 
a motion for summary judgment simply because there could 
not be a counter affidavit filed saying that there was no 
mouse in the can. All that a defendant could do in a 
situation such as is supposed above or in this case would 
be to rely on circumstantial evidence and the wisdom and 
honesty and good judgment of the jury to arrive at a 
correct verdict. Id. at 705-706 (emphasis added) 
In the case at hand, the defendant cannot produce the 
testimony or affidavit of the deceased, Marlon Cutler. However, 
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defendant can produce significant evidence as to the ambiguities of 
the contract, Mr. Cutler's understanding and intent relating 
thereto, and evidence concerning the equities of a division of the 
insurance proceeds. 
Even more compelling is the fact that the affidavits upon 
which plaintiff relied are legally insufficient, rely on hearsay 
and fail to address the decedent's intent and understanding as to 
paragraph 3(c) of the stipulation and the omission of that 
paragraph from the decree of divorce. Clearly defendant should be 
afforded the opportunity to present evidence at a trial on the 
merits. 
II. EXPLICIT LANGUAGE MUST EXIST IN THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE IN ORDER TO DIVEST THE EXPECTANCY 
INTEREST OF THE NAMED BENEFICIARY. 
Plaintiff contends that Culbertson v. Continental Assurance 
Co. , 631 P. 2d 906 (Utah, 1981) is inapplicable because in 
Culbertson the ex-wife was the named beneficiary and the widow 
brought the action in equity to have the proceeds given to her. 
Contrary to plaintiff's reading of Culbertson, the case stands for 
the proposition that a court must find specific enforceable 
language in the decree of divorce in order to divest the named 
beneficiary's expectancy interest in the life insurance proceeds. 
The case specifically deals with whether a named beneficiary may 
retain the life insurance proceeds due to a lack of clarity or 
specificity in the decree of divorce. Under the Culbertson 
analysis, there must be a finding as to whether there exists an 
expectancy interest in both the plaintiff and the defendant. The 
trial court never did address these factual issues in the present 
case. 
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Plaintiff also attempts to rely on Travelers Insurance Company 
v. Lewis 531 P. 2d 484 (Utah 1975) . The factual circumstance in 
that case was similar to the case at hand; however the language 
which addressed the life insurance policy in the decree of divorce 
was very specific and unambiguous. The provision designated the 
policy amounts, and specifically defined who would be the 
beneficiary and stated that the minor children would be named 
contingent beneficiaries. Travelers falls directly under the 
Culbertson analysis. Culbertson requires a court to define whether 
any of the parties have expectancy interests, and if so to divest 
that interest if the language in the decree is clear and not open 
to interpretation. However, like the case at hand, if the language 
is unclear and ambiguities exist, a court should not divest the 
named beneficiary's expectancy interest without a trial on the 
merits. See Culbertson, 631 P.2d at 912. 
III. MANIFEST INJUSTICE EXISTS WHEN A RULING FAILS 
TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT EQUITABLE FACTS WHICH 
VALIDATE THE APPELLANT'S EXPECTANCY INTEREST. 
The trial court failed to address the competing equities in 
the case and refused to allow the defendant the opportunity to 
present such evidence. In so doing, the court relied on legally 
insufficient affidavits which did not sufficiently prove that no 
material issue of fact existed as to the understanding and intent 
of the parties in relation to the language in the stipulation and 
the lack of language in the decree. Furthermore, the trial court 
failed to allow the defendant to present evidence at a trial on the 
merits of competing equities which support at a minimum a division 
of the policy proceeds between the parties. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests that the judgment be reversed 
and the proceeds of the life insurance policies be awarded to the 
defendant, or alternatively, that the case be remanded with 
instructions to divide the proceeds equitably. 
DATED this ^ day of December, 1993 
QHRISTOPJffiR L. SHAW 
t t o r n e y f o r A p p e l l a n t / D e f e n d a n t 
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DETERMINATIVE RULE 
DFC 1 0 7993 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Rule 56- Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant, A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending par ty. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Fo rm of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of Iris pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application fot* judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
